Is our Navy prepared?

Winslow Wheeler, former Congressional staffer for both Republicans and Democrats and now working for a Washington think tank, Project On Government Oversight (POGO), has written a series of articles that should cause some concern about the adequacy of our navy.

Wheeler first raises questions as to the reality of the Navy budget.  Over the next 30 years the Navy plans to add about 30 ships to its fleet.  Wheeler has no problem with that.  His problem is that the budget for this growth is totally inadequate.  The size of the fleet shrank from 316 to 282 in the Bush years, despite a 51% growth in the total budget.  Obama has managed to add only two ships to the fleet.  Wheeler concludes that the per-unit costs of a ship have been growing faster than the growth in the budget.  The estimates the Navy is making are far lower than the likely future costs; thus, there is no way the Navy can meet its projected building plans.

Worse than the budget problem is the question of whether the Navy is properly equipped to meet potential threats.  In the exercises conducted over the past twenty years, the Navy has had very great difficulty locating diesel-electric submarines used by potential enemies.  In these exercises almost all aircraft carriers have been "sunk" by this type of submarine.  Then take the question of sea mines.  In the post-World War II-era 19 Navy ships have been sunk or seriously damaged, 15 of them by sea mines.

In 2010 the Navy completed a study of the surface fleet’s manning, training, and equipment readiness. The conclusions: ship maintenance went underfunded for years; one-fifth of the fleet cannot pass inspections; aircraft and ships had junk as equipment and/or insufficient spare parts; fewer than one half of deployed combat aircraft are fully mission-capable at any given time; training throughout the surface fleet has been inadequate; ships are undermanned, and returning ships are cannibalized for parts to keep others running. The fleet was in substantially worse shape than it was in 2001.

Wheeler concludes:

The prospects of finding the money to address these shortfalls are bleak: the Navy plans to put its budget emphasis on new hardware, not maintenance, and is not even certain that the limited funds it does seek for maintenance will be available.