Learning from Vietnam

By now you must have at least heard that Melvin Laird, Nixon’s Secretary of Defense during part of the Vietnam War, has written an article in Foreign Affairs comparing Vietnam and Iraq. He has some harsh words about our conduct in managing both wars, but also feels that we did not lose in Vietnam and, if his advice is followed, we will eventually win in Iraq.

Laird urges a view of history based on facts rather than emotions, but the problem is that my facts may be your fantasy. It’s very hard to know where truth lies especially after the passing of decades. He calls Vietnam “an ugly, mismanaged, tragic episode in US history” from which “there are many valuable lessons to be learned”. It’s hard to disagree with him on this when he was one of the managers.

He blames the media for most Americans' perceptions that the South Vietnamese forces were not very effective. In Laird’s view “from the Tet offensive in 1968 up to the fall of Saigon in 1975, South Vietnam never lost a major battle.” I guess I’m one of the brainwashed as I would think that, if you never lost a major battle in seven years, it’s highly unlikely that you would have been so dependent on US support or that Saigon would have fallen so readily.

Basically, he feels that the major thing that Vietnam should have taught us is that we can support countries we want to save only by giving them money and training but not our troops. In Laird’s words “The war needed to be turned back to the people who cared about it, the Vietnamese.” Fact or fantasy?

His view is that Vietnam was a “success story in nation building”. Is there a nation of South Vietnam somewhere?

He also attributes Vietnam as having played a role in the winning of the Cold War by sucking resources from Russia. I wonder what Reagan would say about that.

“The Vietcong were largely suppressed by a combination of persuasion and force.” Fact or fantasy?

The nub of his advice: define a standard of competence for the Iraqi troops and, when that standard is met, start bringing US troops home in corresponding numbers. One of the problems I have with this advice is Laird is speaking in terms of quantitative standards only. I would think the quality of the troops would have some bearing on this decision. And, I think that Morton Halperin has some strong arguments here as to the degree of commitment - to Iraq as opposed to the insurgency - of some in the Iraqi forces. If Halperin is right, then Laird’s advice may only be a smokescreen for our exiting Iraq.

Laird is a veteran and has been at the heart of American policy making. Who am I to dispute his statement that “wars are fluid things and missions change”? From my comfortable, non-veteran’s chair, I would think this statement true with regard to battles or military campaigns. However, virtually every pre-21st century war that we have fought had, in my judgment a clear, constant mission.

He makes an interesting point about the effect of modern media on people’s attitude toward the war when he asks how much support WWII would have had if we could have seen the D-Day landing in real time. I believe that part of the backlash re Vietnam was the sight of the caskets coming home and the battles being fought on tv. That is clearly why Bush is trying to keep things as hidden from us as possible.

Laird also has some sound advice for Bush and Rumsfeld.

Advice for Bush
Tell America there is an exit strategy.
Level with the American people.
Articulate a simple message and mission, which is we are “fighting to preserve modern culture, Western democracy, the global economy and all else that is threatened by the spread of barbarism in the name of religion.”
Treat the people at Guantanamo more humanely as to continue not to “puts us on a slippery slope toward the inhumanity we deplore”.
Work with our traditional allies.

Advice for Rumsfeld
“show more deference to Congress” or soon they’ll stop funding your efforts in Iraq.
Fire the top people who allowed Abu Gharaib.