How not to manage

Foreign Affairs' May issue will feature an article based on a military study of documents and people that became available after the fall of Baghdad. The article was written by some of the key participants in the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Iraqi Perspectives Project. The article portrays Saddam as someone with a very different sense of reality who managed a bunch of sycophants (which was probably necessary if they did not want to be executed for disagreeing with Saddam). A few interesting excerpts:

• The single most important element in Saddam's strategic calculus was his faith that France and Russia would prevent an invasion by the United States.
• An internal revolt was Saddam's biggest fear.
• Saddam and those around him believed virtually every word issued by their own propaganda machine.
• Concerned about everything except fighting wars, the Iraqi military...became focused on militarily irrelevant issues.
• Even with his regime under dire threat, Saddam's thoughts were never far from the regional power balance.
• Everyone around Saddam understood that his need to hear only good news was constantly growing and that it was in their best interest to feed that hunger.
• One was the requirement to embellish even the simplest message with praise for Saddam.
• He made his most fateful decisions in isolation.
• The threat of another uprising constantly remained his top security concern.
• "The Special Security Office knew how many times I went to the bathroom."
• In the end, Saddam determined that the most important factor for military success lay in the spirit of the warrior.

You have to wonder how many other 'leaders' display such traits. It's probably a good thing that history is written by the winners, that is, if you are on the winning side. You don't want to know how weird your side is.