The State of Our National Guard and Army Reserve

The Commission on National Guards and Reserves has issued a report on the state of the guards and reserves. It's not pretty. Here are its conclusions (with my emphasis added):

Conclusion One: The nation requires an operational reserve force. However, DOD and Congress have had no serious public discussion or debate on the matter, and have not formally adopted the operational reserve. Steps taken by DOD and Congress have been more reactive than proactive, more timid than bold, and more incremental than systemic. They thus far have not focused on an overarching set of alterations necessary to make the reserve components a ready, rotational force. Congress and DOD have not reformed the laws and policies governing the reserve components in ways that will sustain an operational force.

Conclusion Two: The Department of Defense must be fully prepared to protect American lives and property in the homeland. DOD must improve its capabilities and readiness to play a primary role in the response to major catastrophes that incapacitate civilian government over a wide geographic area. This is a responsibility that is equal in priority to its combat responsibilities. As part of DOD, the National Guard and Reserves should play the lead role in supporting the Department of Homeland Security, other federal agencies, and states in addressing these threats of equal or higher priority.

Conclusion Three: Current law and policy still reflect a Cold War–era vision of the employment of valuable military manpower assets and do not adequately support an operational 21st-century force. A new integrated personnel management structure is needed to provide trained and ready forces to meet mission requirements and to foster a continuum of service for the individual service member.

Conclusion Four: The reserve components have responded to the call for service. Despite shortages in equipment, training, and personnel they have once again proven their essential contribution to meeting national security requirements in a time of need. To sustain their service for the duration of the global war on terror will require maintaining the force at a new standard of readiness. Current policies cannot accomplish this task. A ready, capable, and accessible operational reserve will require an enduring commitment to invest in the readiness of the reserve

components. This commitment will necessitate service integration, additional resources, and new constructs for employing the reserve components and for assessing readiness.

Conclusion Five: To maintain an operational reserve force over the long term, DOD must appropriately support not only the service members themselves but also the two major influencers of members’ decisions to remain in the military—their families and employers. Significant improvements in current programs in all three areas are essential to sustain an operational reserve force both today and in the future.

Conclusion Six: The current reserve component structure does not meet the needs of an operational reserve force. Major changes in DOD organization, reserve component categories, and culture are needed to ensure that management of reserve and active component capabilities are integrated to maximize the effectiveness of the total force for both operational and strategic purposes.