"Guests, like fish, begin to smell after three days"

It's an old saying, but it is the one that Col. Timothy R. Reese uses to introduce his argument that we should declare victory in Iraq and go home. I'd never heard of Reese but he is Chief, Baghdad Operations Command Advisory Team. Earlier he was the honcho of what the Times calls the "the Army's premier intellectual center". I suspect he knows just a little bit more about the situation in Iraq than I or you do. His fundamental point, based on the analogy in the title of this post, is that "we now smell bad to the Iraqi nose". He subscribes to the theory that sometimes it's okay to be good enough. Thus, he asserts that the Iraqi army is good enough to handle any attempts at revolution by Iraqi dissidents. As importantly, Reese feels that we are not making either the government or the army of Iraq any better by hanging around. A quote from Reese - Iraq is not a country with a history of treating even its welcomed guests well.

He gives several examples of the lack of progress in essential services and good governance:

1. The ineffectiveness and corruption of GOI (Government of Iraq) Ministries is the stuff of legend.

2. The anti-corruption drive is little more than a campaign tool for Maliki

3. The GOI is failing to take rational steps to improve its electrical infrastructure and to improve their oil exploration, production and exports.

4. There is no progress towards resolving the Kirkuk situation.

5. Sunni Reconciliation is at best at a standstill and probably going backwards.

6. Sons of Iraq (SOI) or Sahwa transition to ISF (Iraq Security Forces) and GOI civil service is not happening, and SOI monthly paydays continue to fall further behind.

7. The Kurdish situation continues to fester.

8. Political violence and intimidation is rampant in the civilian community as well as military and legal institutions.

9. The Vice President received a rather cool reception this past weekend and was publicly told that the internal affairs of Iraq are none of the US’s business.

He goes on to argue that we are not getting our money's worth from the work we are doing with the Iraqi military. Again, from Reese's memo:

1. If there ever was a window where the seeds of a professional military culture could have been implanted, it is now long past. US combat forces will not be here long enough or with sufficient influence to change it.

2. The military culture of the Baathist-Soviet model under Saddam Hussein remains entrenched and will not change. The senior leadership of the ISF is incapable of change in the current environment.

a) Corruption among officers is widespread

b) Neglect and mistreatment of enlisted men is the norm

c) The unwillingness to accept a role for the NCO corps continues

d) Cronyism and nepotism are rampant in the assignment and promotion system

e) Laziness is endemic

f) Extreme centralization of C2 is the norm

g) Lack of initiative is legion

h) Unwillingness to change, do anything new blocks progress

i) Near total ineffectiveness of the Iraq Army and National Police institutional organizations and systems prevents the ISF from becoming self-sustaining

j) For every positive story about a good ISF junior officer with initiative, or an ISF commander who conducts a rehearsal or an after action review or some individual MOS training event, there are ten examples of the most basic lack of military understanding despite the massive partnership efforts by our combat forces and advisory efforts by MiTT and NPTT teams.

3. For all the fawning praise we bestow on the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) and Ministry of Defense (MoD) leadership for their effectiveness since the start of the surge, they are flawed in serious ways. Below are some salient examples:

a) They are unable to plan ahead, unable to secure the PM’s approval for their actions

b) They are unable to stand up to Shiite political parties

c) They were and are unable to conduct an public relations effort in support of the SA and now they are afraid of the ignorant masses as a result

d) They unable to instill discipline among their officers and units for the most basic military standards

e) They are unable to stop the nepotism and cronyism

f) They are unable to take basic steps to manage the force development process

g) They are unable to stick to their deals with US leaders

The June 30th pullback is not having a positive effect with regard to the Iraqi military command. To wit,

1. Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) unilateral restrictions on US forces that violate the most basic aspects of the SA (2008 Security Agreement)

2. BOC unilateral restrictions that violate the most basic aspects of the SA

3. International Zone incidents in the last week where ISF forces have resorted to shows of force to get their way at Entry Control Points (ECP) including the forcible takeover of ECP 1 on 4 July

4. Sudden coolness to advisors and CDRs, lack of invitations to meetings,

5. Widespread partnership problems reported in other areas such as ISF confronting US forces at TCPs in the city of Baghdad and other major cities in Iraq.

6. ISF units are far less likely to want to conduct combined combat operations with US forces, to go after targets the US considers high value, etc.

7. The Iraqi legal system in the Rusafa side of Baghdad has demonstrated a recent willingness to release individuals originally detained by the US for attacks on the US.

Reese makes the point that we are "merely convenient targets for delivering a message against Maliki by certain groups." But the Iraqis will try to get as much out of us as possible while making sure we have little say in what goes on in Iraq. Reese quotes a political observer, “We have lost all strategic influence with the GoI and trying to influence events and people from the tactical/operational level is courting disaster, wasting lives, and merely postponing the inevitable.”

His view of the Iraqi government - "We now have an Iraqi government that has gained its balance and thinks it knows how to ride the bike in the race. And in fact they probably do know how to ride, at least well enough for the road they are on against their current competitors. Our hand on the back of the seat is holding them back and causing resentment. We need to let go before we both tumble to the ground."

Surprisingly, Reese recommends a withdrawal date of August 2010, only 15 months from the scheduled date. The argument he makes is, to me, much stronger. We should start packing up today.