The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan has released its final report. My previous postings on the subject should have alerted you to the fact that this final report is not a pleasant one.
The report begins as follows (my emphases):
Contractors represent more than half of the U.S. presence in the contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, at times employing more than a quarter-million people. They have performed vital tasks in support of U.S. defense, diplomatic, and development objectives. But the cost has been high. Poor planning, management, and oversight of contracts has led to massive waste and has damaged these objectives.
The volume and complexity of contract actions have overwhelmed the ability of government to plan for, manage, and oversee contractors in theater. Contracting decisions made during urgent contingencies have often neglected the need to determine whether host-nation governments can or will sustain the many projects and programs that U.S. contracts have established in their countries.
Americans’ “Can do!” response to the challenge of contingency operations is admirable, but human and financial resources have limits, and long-term costs are seldom considered when short-term plans are being framed. Much of the waste, fraud, and abuse revealed in Iraq and Afghanistan stems from trying to do too much, treating contractors as a free resource, and failing to adapt U.S. plans and U.S. agencies’ responsibilities to host-nation cultural, political, and economic settings.
Here is a summary of what the investigations found:
- An over-reliance on contractors
- Poor rules governing the situations when contractors should be used
- Poor management of contractors
- Failing to consider whether the new projects can be maintained by Iraq and Afghanistan
- Organizational structure prevents proper management
- Little competition, crappy management and lax enforcement
What this all led to was at least $30 billion wasted dollars and possibly double that.
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