CONFE
WINNING THE WAR BY WINNING THE PEACE:
STRATEGY FOR CONFLICT AND POST-CONFLICT IN THE 21st CENTURY
Fifteenth Annual Strategy Conference
Lloyd J. Matthews
December 2004
The conference architecture did not provide for a canvass or survey of participants’ views on particular issues, so it is not feasible to arrive at consensus findings and recommendations. However, informal analysis of remarks by panelists and other speakers reveals such strong recurrent endorsements of some proposals that it will be
useful to highlight them. While no claim to unanimity can be made regarding these positions, it can be said that a number of participants expressed support for them in one guise or another, and that few if any voices were raised in opposition. The positions in behalf of which significant support was expressed are as follows.
• More troops are required for the war in
• The date
• We need greater international participation in the Iraqi nation-building effort, preferably under the aegis of the UN. Significantly, not a great deal was offered about how this step can now be achieved, although most participants appeared to favor greater multinational involvement.
• As soon as possible, we need to turn the reins of Iraqi government over to an indigenous entity that will be viewed as legitimate and that will have the muscle to maintain order. However, it seemed to be assumed that for an indefinite period, a Coalition troop presence would continue to be necessary in an overwatch posture, even after an Iraqi government takes formal control.
• A finding corollary to the foregoing was that the
• Even with some troop increases, the
• The only credible institutions for mounting nation-building efforts are the Army and the Marine Corps, but even they are maladapted for such work. Faced with this dilemma, several conferees were inclined to explore the concept of constituting civil reconstruction corps (modeled after CORDS in the Vietnam War?) subordinate to the joint task force commander.
• We cannot replicate Western-style democracy and representative government in Muslim-majority states of the
• There can be no military solution in
constituencies.
• In the global war on terrorism, conclusive victory in the classic sense is probably unattainable. This sentiment was rarely expressed outright, but was implicit in the frequent use of such terms as “war of unlimited duration” and “war of uncertain outcome.” The sentiment was also present in the view of those who regarded the best attainable result as a gradual rapproachement between the haves and have nots of the world. Here, economic integration and equality, with a consequent dissipation of alienation and mutual hostility, offered the best chance of ultimately nudging the two camps to a peaceful modus vivendi.
1 comment:
Al, my own view on Iraq is that this administration is still missing the obvious. Much has been made lately of the 'success' of the elections, and of course the ordinary 'man-in-the-street' Iraqi wants democracy, but what will impede the process for many years is the larger, overall view of those who hold power in the Middle East and see Iraq as just an American foothold to promote its interests in the area - producing a 'pincer-type' stranglehold in conjunction with Israel. It is this fear, coupled with what is seen in many quarters as an attack on Islam, that will keep the Iraqi unrest alive for the forseeable future.
The SSI conclusions contain a lot of common sense, but as you have rightly asked before - does anyone in the administration bother to read it?
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