What does 'summary' mean?

According to Merriam-Webster it means 'covering the main points succinctly'. Under that definition the Executive Summary in the Pentagon's latest report to Congress on progress in Iraq does not qualify as a summary. I read the Executive Summary in today's NY Times and could not figure out why the media reports sounded so negative since the only negatives in the Summary referred primarily to the ongoing violence.

So, I went to the Pentagon's site to see what it said about the report and to get a link to it that I could post here. Unfortunately, all I could find was the press release about the report's issuance; it was even more positive than the Executive Summary.

Here are some interesting excerpts from the report itself:

Security issues (e.g., the attempted kidnapping of a deputy minister and threats to ministry personnel who work with Embassy teams) have made some ministers reluctant to have U.S. personnel visit them. This reluctance hampers coordination between the Coalitionand some ministry personnel. Internal politics (e.g., political party affiliation) is also an obstacle to progress in some ministries.

Some Iraqi ministers tend to focus on nearterm performance, rather than on long-term capacity building. A lack of effective procedures within the ministries, such as policy development, procurement, and budgeting, was endemic to the Iraqi government underSaddam Hussein, and three years is not enough time to reverse decades of organizational incapacity. This situation should improve with time.

Lack of proper “tools,” such as information technology, finance systems, and planning capabilities, inhibit the governing of complex issues. The result is that Iraqi planning, budgeting, and execution processes are less than fully effective. IRMO is currently procuring and developing these tools, but it will take time—years rather than months—before Government of Iraq staff is able to use these tools fully and to manage the ministries to full effectiveness.

However, the borders are porous, and eliminating the transfer of illegal material and foreign fighters into Iraq is a formidable challenge.

Corruption in the ministries has further hampered their capabilities. Experienced or talented employees are often purged and replaced with party elements/cronies as a result of a spoils system. Many of Iraq’s political factions tend to view government ministries and their associated budgets as sources of power, patronage, and funding for their parties. Ministers without strong party ties often face significant pressure from the political factions, and sometimes have little control over the politically appointed and connected people serving under them. Still entrenched in the culture of the former regime, some ministry personnel are reluctant to exercise independent initiative or to take any bold action to address Iraq’s problems of corruption.

Estimates of unemployment in Iraq vary widely. The UN World Food Program’s 2005 estimate is 13.4%; other estimates are as high as 50%–60%. As of July 2006, the Government of Iraq Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology (COSIT) estimated that unemployment was 18% and underemployment was 34%. The COSIT estimates were corroborated by a 2005 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) survey and recent nationwide polling.

Using data collected in 2004, the UN World Food Program estimates that 15.4% of the surveyed population in Iraq lacks adequate food. Including both severe and moderate forms, about 25.9% of the Iraqi children examined were stunted in their physical growth, a symptom of chronic malnutrition.

High inflation is threatening Iraq’s overall macroeconomic stability. Inflation continues to be volatile, with spikes generally caused by commodity shortages and seasonal variations. The annual inflation rate from June 2005 to June 2006 was 52.5%, according to COSIT. The CBI needs to take steps to control inflation.Polling data indicate that the Iraqi public’s perceptions of the household financial situation are mixed, although public perceptions are generally more pessimistic than they were a year ago.

The Bayji refinery in northern Iraq is a critical element in Iraq’s national oil infrastructure. Built in the 1980s, the Bayji refinery is Iraq’s largest and newest refinery. This refinery typifies many of the challenges Iraq faces as it attempts to modernize its aging infrastructure and increase its oil exports. Bayji has a nominal production capacity of 310,000 barrels per day. However, since May 2006, the refinery has not produced more than 170,000 barrels per day, and recent production has been as low as 7,500 barrels per day. Four primary factors have limited production at the Bayji refinery: maintenance issues with key components in the refinery, an inefficient refining process, an unreliable flow of crude oil into the refinery, and security threats to personnel.

Maintaining the refinery’s outdated equipment is a challenge. Two of the refinery’s three plants have been shut down since May 2006 due to mechanical breakdowns, scheduled maintenance, power outages, and fires. One power outage damaged the refinery’s US$20 million hydrocracker, a critical piece of equipment used to convert heavy fuel oil to usable products.

A second factor limiting production at Bayji is inefficiency in its refining process. For every two barrels of crude oil brought into the refinery, Bayji produces about one barrel of usable product, for an efficiency rate of about 50%; modern refineries can have efficiencies of 90% or higher. The result of the inefficient refining process is a large amount of heavy fuel oil (HFO) byproduct. Bayji does not have adequate facilities to refine further, store, or dispose of this byproduct; the excess HFO thus interferes with production and storage of usable products.

Iraq averaged 14 hours of power per day this quarter, an improvement of 3 hours per day over the previous quarter. Baghdad averaged 8 hours of power per day, twice what it had averaged six months earlier.

New projects have “added capacity to provide an estimated 4.2 million people with access to potable water—an increase of 1.2 million people since the May 2006 report—but direct measurement of water actually delivered to Iraqis is not available.”

Although the increases in the official prices have reduced the economic incentive to smuggle fuel, smuggling fuel for resale inside and outside the country remains a serious issue.

Overall, Iraqi casualties increased by 51% compared to the previous quarter.

Although the overall number of attacks increased in all categories, the proportion of those attacks directed against civilians increased substantially. Nationally, in April 2006, civilians were the target of 11% of attacks; this increased to 15% in June 2006.

As with the IPS, the National Police payroll is significantly larger than its authorized endstrength. There are currently more than 29,000 National Police on the MOI payroll, but it is unknown how many of these have been trained and equipped. Absenteeism among National Police units generally follows the same pattern as in the military. Leave policies and immature personnel management policies account for 30%–40% of personnel not present for duty. Absenteeism in the IPS is difficult to quantify because shift schedules preclude PTTs from ascertaining which police officers are absent and which are simply offduty.

The DBE payroll is also larger than its authorized end-strength, with 25,832 DBE personnel on the MOI payroll. It is currently unknown how many untrained DBE personnel are on the rolls and how many of the trained and equipped border personnel have left the MOI. As with the other personnel issues, an effective personnel management system will help resolve these reporting and accountability deficiencies.

A lack of effective leadership and policies to stem corruption through accountability for actions, equipment, and personnel have enabled the theft of pay and equipment, unlawful detentions, and reported cases of abduction and torture or execution of Sunnis.

In the Iraqi Army, approximately 15% attrition is the norm for initial training. When a unit is fully trained and employed in combat operations, some soldiers find that they do not like the particular location or they cannot cope with dangers of the counter-insurgency. Absent-without-leave rates are typically about 1%–4% for most Iraqi Army divisions,although deployments to combat sometimes cause absentee spikes of 5%–8%. However,soldiers in units in this final stage of development are less likely to abandon the service. As with any organization, the units with strong, competent leaders tend to have higher present-for-duty rates than those with weak leaders. However, there is currently no judicial punishment system within the Iraqi Army. Therefore, Iraqi Army commanders have little legal leverage to compel their soldiers to combat, and soldiers and police can quit with impunity.

This does not sound anywhere near as positive as the Executive Summary. In fact, it's downright frightening.