The Iraqi Elections

Anthony Cordesman takes a preliminary look at the elections. Like most things about Iraq today, the results are uncertain. True Maliki 'won', but he did not get a majority in any of the nine provinces where the vote count is complete. The best he did was 38%, the worst 11%; maybe with the number of parties running, these results are not bad. The major Sunni party, the Islamic Supreme Council, did not do very well. In general, Cordesman is relatively pleased with the results, but there is always a 'however'.

However, there are many local areas where these results may lead to violence or divisive power struggles. These elections did not resolve any of the political uncertainties and potential sources of violence that Iraq must face in the coming year. They also lay the groundwork for practical struggles to see who controls positions, money, the police, and influence in virtually every province where a vote occurred.

The outcome will bring meaningful local representation to Iraq for the first time and may help put it on a more pragmatic political path. It is clear, however, that they are only the prelude to a year-long struggle going into the national elections and that there is only so long that the Arab-Kurdish issue can be kept on hold.

Many of those elected also have little or no real political experience or experience with governance. This is not a casual problem. Iraqi has dropped from a nation with an unspent budget surplus to a nation caught up in the global financial crisis and which will not get further major donations of foreign aid. Unemployment, poor government services, and infrastructure problems remain critical. The Iraqi government is the source of virtually all surplus income and is the direct or direct employer of roughly 70 percent of the jobs outside the agricultural sector. Iraqis have already shown they want strong leadership and care more about the quality of governance than the way that their government is chosen.