Russia in Afghanistan

George Wilson contends that Gates' long tenure with the CIA has made him quite sensitive to the mistakes Russia made in Afghanistan. This is not the first time someone has looked at the experience of Russia in Afghanistan. To advance his argument, Wilson also quotes from Defense Intelligence Agency reports of twenty-five years ago:

Thanks to the National Security Archive at The George Washington University, inspired by former Washington Post reporter Scott Armstrong, many of the formerly hush-hush U.S. intelligence reports which shaped Gates’ views on Afghanistan are available to the public. The Defense Intelligence Agency, for example, wrote in 1983 that “the effect of the Soviet occupation of Afghan­istan has been catastrophic for the development of the Afghan economy.” Another formerly secret intelligence report that applies to U. S. forces in Afghanistan today states: “Given the mountainous terrain and numerous passes throughout the border area, we believe that even with a few additional divisions the Soviet force level would be too small to stem insurgent infiltration appreciably. Although the Soviets can drive insurgents from an area temporarily and will occasionally score victories against individual bands, they will be unable to establish control over much of the country. Soviet estimates of the force necessary to seal the border with Pakistan have varied from nine to 17 divisions.

“We do not believe the Soviets foresee an early ‘vic­tory’ in Afghanistan or have any compelling reason to seek one,” continued the formerly secret intelligence report on the Soviets’ 1979-89 occupation. “In our view, they probably cling to the hope that — despite the dis­mal results thus far — their efforts to buy support for the Kabul regime, rebuild the Afghan armed forces and seek converts by promoting social and economic re­forms will eventually bear fruit.”

Sound familiar? It should to any government official or general who tried to quell the insurgencies in Viet­nam and Iraq. In both those conflicts, U.S. presidents eventually — after thousands of U.S. and civilians lives were lost — concluded that the only way to get American troops out of the quagmires was to hand the counterinsurgency wars over to the native armies. Will Obama listen to Gates, our first Defense secretary who is truly an expert on what can and cannot be done in Afghanistan, or follow President Lyndon Johnson’s di­sastrous path and keep throwing American troops into the quagmire in pursuit of “victory?”