Can you find 26 people who will agree on a very complex subject?

Some newspaper stories have lambasted NASA because seven of the twenty-six panel members of the Return to Flight Task Group published a dissent to the conclusions reached by the Task Group, although the Task Group’s report was far from a whitewash.

The Task Group was charged with reviewing how well NASA had implemented seventeen recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. Looked at strictly by the numbers, NASA did okay: they implemented eleven, had mixed results with three and did not succeed with three.

It so happens that the three not implemented are thought by some to be the most critical recommendations: to eliminate all foam insulation debris from the external fuel tank; harden the shuttle's heat-shield system to resist any impacts that do occur; and develop reliable tile and wing leading edge repair techniques. But is improper inspection (which was a problem with Columbia) really less important than any one of the three failures? Yet, that was only one area where NASA improved significantly. What about an improved ability to deal with safety contingencies? As in most cases, we all have our own personal slant on things.

The Task Group concludes by reminding us that “Space, by its nature, is a hostile environment.” “…it is likely that another accident will happen in the future; if not with Space Shuttle, then with whatever vehicle replaces it.”