In the Summer of 1947 "Foreign Affairs” published an article that profoundly changed our views of how to act towards Russia. It’s possible that in the Summer of 2005 they have published an article that will profoundly change our views of how to act in Iraq. The 1947 article, of course, was the proposal of the containment policy by George Kennan. The 2005 article is entitled “How to Win in Iraq” and is written by Andrew Krepinevich, Jr., a retired Army officer and author of “The Army and Vietnam.”
Krepinevich argues that we have no strategy in Iraq, neither for defeating the insurgency nor for achieving our larger objectives. This comes as no surprise. He feels that Bush describes a withdrawal plan not a strategy when he says, “Our strategy can be summed up this way: as the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down.” Nor does the author feel that a speedy withdrawal is much of a strategy either. As has been said before, withdrawing now will only makes things worse for us, for the region and for most Iraqis.
Krepinevich proposes an “oil-spot strategy”. You defeat the insurgents not by killing them, but by making the regular Iraqis secure and able to lead a fairly normal life. That is, the cliche “winning hearts and minds” is, in fact, mandatory to defeat the insurgents. His ‘oil-spot’ idea is to focus on building up areas where the people can feel safe and can live fairly normally. Once those goals have been achieved for an area(s) you can expand the area, just as an oil spot starts small and seeps to cover a large area.
Krepinevich acknowledges that the strategy is risky, costly and requires us to be in Iraq for a long time. But it is a strategy that has worked in Malaysia and the Philippines. He feels that it is a clear strategy that should be presented to the American people, who can decide whether the costs of implementing the are ones they want to bear. His confidence in this country’s people echoes Senator Biden’s.
Let’s look at more of what Krepinevich has to say.
The Face of the Insurgency
In Krepinevich’s view the insurgency has three causes: the lack of any post-war planning by Rumsfeld and company; Iraq’s tradition of government being the prize of those who wrest power by violence; the jihad caused by our invasion of Iraq.
Since the insurgents cannot beat us militarily, their goal is to promote disorder and prevent the establishment of a legitimate Iraqi government. Their arguments are simple. if the leaders of the nascent government can be killed and captured, how can the average Ali feel safe? And, they also rely on Reagan’s question, “Are you better off today than four years ago?”.
There are some things with regard to the insurgency that are working in our favor, according to Krepinevich. The insurgents are fairly isolated from the people; Sunnis comprise the majority of the insurgents, but are only 20% of the population. And, they have no positive message to inspire the people’s support.
Centers of Gravity
Krepinevich recognizes that we have to “win the hearts and minds” of three different constituencies: the Iraqis, the American public and the American soldier. Essentially, all three groups must believe that the war is worth the sacrifice and progress is being made. It’s very difficult to really make the case if we don’t have real control of an area. And, our current modus vivendi does not give us that control.
The way we are operating now emphasizes killing the enemy while minimizing American casualties. He feels that we should emphasize the security of the Iraqis. Our various ‘operations’ have little lasting effect; once we leave, things essentially return to what was happening before we attacked. We’re focusing on the number of Iraqis trained, rather than how well they are trained.
The big problem in combating insurgencies is obtaining good intelligence about the insurgents. Unless the Iraqis feel that defeat of the insurgents is in their interests and they are living a reasonably normal life, it’s unlikely that they will give us the intelligence they have and we need.
History Lessons
Today, life in fourteen of Iraq’s eighteen provinces is reasonably normal and secure as these provinces are controlled by coalition troops or local militia, such as the Pesh Merga. It is in these provinces that the ‘oil-spot’ should begin. And, it can begin, by making the Iraq army stronger through training, embedding our soldiers in Iraq units and providing quick-reaction troops to aid the Iraqis.
The quick rotating of officers and generals must stop. This was needs the most capable leaders we have. It is a serious mistake to bring experienced, highly capable officers back to sit at a desk in Washington when they could be leading troops in Iraq.
The Grand Bargain
You defeat the insurgency only if the political and the military are interrelated. Politically, we should strive to win over ‘a substantial portion’ of each of the Iraq major groups, Sunni, Shia, Kurd, so that we would have the critical mass necessary to support a democratic and unified Iraq. But, in order to do so, we need to understand Iraqi tribal politics, which is almost always in flux.
Better Metrics
An axiom of my managerial canon is “You can’t manage if you don’t measure.” So, I was pleased to see this topic.
Krepinevich proposes some interesting metrics: the number of assassinated government officials (can the government protect its own), the number of insurgent leaders killed (which would discourage recruits), battles which we initiate (meaning we’re getting good intelligence from Iraqis), the price paid by the insurgents to someone willing to bomb his fellow Iraqis (the higher the price, the fewer supporters).
Will our leaders listen?
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