When will they be ready?

Tony Cordesman has some reservations as to just how ready the Iraqi forces are to take over today and tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. He points out that the reporting of this fact has been neither crystal clear nor exactly honest. Here are the major problems he sees.

• Iraqi Police Force: In contrast to the limited successes in training the Iraqi Army, much of the Coalition police training effort has been a failure. While manpower levels in the IP are difficult to ascertain with accuracy, it is clear that a large proportion of IPs in Iraq did not receive Coalition training or equipment. Many IPs are hired locally by Provincial or local government officials. These officials themselves are often of dubious loyalty to the central government of Iraq, and the IPs they hire are likewise often of questionable loyalty. The percentage of IPs hired outside of the Coalition-sponsored train and equip program appears to be growing. Attempts to free IP units from local influence have largely failed, and MNSTC-I seems to have accepted de-facto local control of MOI forces for the time being.

Official reporting on the MOI and the IP in particular is extremely misleading. It is unclear what MNF-I’s current goals are for developing various elements of the police. It is also unclear how the new provincial powers law, and coming provincial elections, will affect the police force, how local and central elements will influence the force, and even how large the force will be in its end state. Official reporting on the manning, equipping, and training of the IP remains highly inaccurate.

• Slow Progress in the Local Rule of Law: There has been some progress at the highest levels in establishing courts and some rule of law. Yet the central government lacks an effective presence in many areas, and the criminal justice and courts system is unable to support the police. The IP needs effective governance and a functioning court system to back it up. The establishment of reliable and impartial courts has been extremely slow, and this has seriously harmed the development of effective MOI forces at the local level. There is little official reporting on Iraq’s jails, the availability of defendants to find counsel, the status of due process, and the role of religious and tribal courts. Furthermore, it is entirely unclear how all of these elements will interact, both at the central and local level.

• National Police: Until 2007, the National Police (NP) acted largely as a Shi’ite force within the MOI, and were responsible for much sectarian violence against Sunnis. Far from being a central-government run nationwide police force, they more often resembled a government funded tool of sectarian intimidation. MNF-I instituted a massive reform program in the NP in 2007. This ongoing program has clearly had some positive outcomes, and has reduced the previous Shi’ite dominance of the force and resulted in the firing of a huge number of the NP’s senior commanders. Many elements still, however, present problems, and it remains to be seen whether the reform program can make the NP a truly non-sectarian force.

• Sons of Iraq: This large mostly Sunni and tribal force is supposed to be temporary, and the ultimate destination of the over 100,000 men in these units is a major uncertainty. While MNSTC-I believes that 20-25% of the Sons of Iraq will be absorbed into the ISF , progress has been slow in this area. What will become of the other 75-80% of these heavily armed men, accustomed to their relatively high salaries, is also a major concern. Unless jobs and economic opportunities are found for the entire force, and Sunnis and mixed tribal groups come to trust in government help and funding, the gains this force has made will be lost and many elements could become hostile to the central government.

• Political and militia influence in the ISF: The “competition among ethnic and sectarian communities” that Gen. Petraeus believes is at the heart of conflict in Iraq includes the struggle for control of the MOD and MOI. Several major political parties, and their respective militias, have gained partial control over many GOI ministries. The MOI and MOD are no exception.

JAM, ISCI/Badr, Daawa, Kurdish groups, Fadilah, Sunni Awakening groups, and a host of smaller groups all vie for control of the various parts of the ISF. In many areas, such as Basra and much of southern Iraq, the Coalition had effectively ceded control of security and local government to these parties. JAM influence over the IP and elements of the IA were exposed in the desertions of ISF personnel during the fighting in Basra in March, 2008.

The MOI is heavily influenced by Shiite parties. At the center, control of the Ministry itself is largely balanced between ISCI and Daawa. Kurdish parties also exert some influence. The JAM exerts varying but significant levels of control at the local level, particularly in the south and in the NP.

The MOD is less influenced by these parties than the MOI, but still faces serious issues. The heavy Coalition presence at all levels of the MOD has helped to contain sectarianism somewhat, as has the presence of so many Sunni officers. Sadly, much of the truly impressive progress the ISF has made in the last 5 years will be rendered moot if its personnel are not loyal to the GOI.

• Intelligence: Iraq’s intelligence apparatus remains divided between a CIA-supported ‘official’ agency (the Iraqi National Intelligence Service or INIS) and a Shi’ite-run agency (under the auspices of the minister of state for national security, Shirwan al-Waely). The levels of competition or cooperation between these agencies remain unclear.

• Provincial Powers Law: The balance of power between the central and provincial governments remains undecided. How the power shifts between the provinces and Baghdad will affect the ISF is unclear. These issues are further compounded by unrealistic reporting on the transfer of security responsibilities by province, when the Iraqi forces are clearly unready to take over the mission.

• Equipment and Logistics: The ISF has made significant progress in the areas of logistics and equipping forces in the field. While the battles of Basra, Sadr City, and Mosul cannot honestly be called military victories for the ISF, they can be seen as testaments to the improved logistics capacity of the ISF. However, many units, especially in the IP, remain critically short of equipment. The IA still lacks armor. While its independence is increasing, the ISF remains dependant on Coalition support, particularly during combat operations.