Barofsky has his say

and it's quite a say. He, the former IG of the TARP, concludes his analysis of what went wrong with TARP with the following:

Treasury’s mismanagement of TARP and its disregard for TARP’s Main Street goals — whether born of incompetence, timidity in the face of a crisis or a mindset too closely aligned with the banks it was supposed to rein in — may have so damaged the credibility of the government as a whole that future policy makers may be politically unable to take the necessary steps to save the system the next time a crisis arises. This avoidable political reality might just be TARP’s most lasting, and unfortunate, legacy.

I'd say that was a fairly strong indictment of Mr. Geithner and his minions.

Barofsky asserts that the TARP's goals for Main Street (i.e., the non big banks) were essentially ignored by Treasury. Further, the money that went to the banks was a gift; the banks had no obligations to lend the money or even tell Treasury how they were spending it.

Barofsky recites the failure of the HAMP program and then writes:

Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner has acknowledged that the program “won’t come close” to fulfilling its original expectations, that its incentives are not “powerful enough” and that the mortgage servicers are “still doing a terribly inadequate job.” But Treasury officials refuse to address these shortfalls. Instead they continue to stubbornly maintain that the program is a success and needs no material change, effectively assuring that Treasury’s most specific Main Street promise will not be honored.

But we know that Geithner will be our man in Treasury for as long as he wants. In any rational organization he would never have been hired. In the current White House he is praised.