Lawrence Korb believes strongly that we need a good, experienced, strong Deputy Defense Secretary, who is really a COO. He harks back to such deputy secretaries as Charles Wilson (under Ike) and David Packard (under Nixon) as the kind of deputy we need; these were people who had relevant experience managing huge organizations. Korb contrasts these with recent deputies, such as Wolfowitz, who had no experience with huge organizations. The deputies Korb favors were able to cut spending while improving security.
The recent deputies have managed in a world where an audit is impossible; the Pentagon may be able to be audited in 2017. They have played games to hide expenditures in the war budgets. And, they have been unwilling to penalize contractors for cost overruns.
Here's a little tidbit about the quality of recent management: "the number of generals and admirals is now higher than it was in 1971, when the military was twice as large as it is today and when commands, such as the Joint Forces Command, duplicated the work of others".
Korb closes with a comparison:
"At the end of Eisenhower's first term, the defense budget was $380 billion in today's dollars; at Nixon's, it was $398 billion; and at George H.W. Bush's, it was $435 billion. At George W. Bush's, it was $478 billion and at the end of Barack Obama's, the baseline budget will be no less than $475 billion and probably closer to $525 billion."
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