Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

Nathaniel Fick and John Nagl know a lot about counterinsurgency; Nagl was one of the authors of the current Army Field manual.

They believe that we are operating from two false premises as regards Afghanistan:

• The border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan cannot be governed.
• Afghans want us out now.

It may not be a Western-style government but for centuries the border area has been governed by local leaders. We should work with them more often and more intelligently to stabilize the area.

Afghans want a normal, simple life and are frustrated that the West cannot provide it. They do not want the Taliban back in control.

The prescription that Fick and Nagl offer is taken from the Counterinsurgency Field Manual and is framed in terms of paradoxes:

1. Some of the best weapons do not shoot. Development is the sine qua non for winning in this country.

2. Sometimes the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be. We need to live and work with the people.

3. The hosts doing something tolerably is often better than foreigners doing it well. We need to help build a viable Afghan security force and competent government.

4. Sometimes the more force is used, the less effective it is. Our bombing strategy is killing too many civilians.

5. Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. We can't win by going into Pakistan. We need to ensure that Pakistan is a solid ally and that the governments of both Pakistan and Afghanistan can be viable.